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Abstract: Designing and adopting a global response to address the rise of chronic diseases 
in both the industrial and developing world requires policymakers to engage in global 
health diplomacy. In the context of the recent United Nations’ High-Level Summit on  
Non-Communicable Diseases, the paper first reviews the rationale for collective action at 
the global level to address the rise of non-communicable diseases (NCDs), given the 
perceived limited cross-border dimensions of NCDs. Secondly, based on the social 
sciences literature studying policymaking at the domestic and international level, this 
article highlights recommendations on how to engage during the main phases of the policy 
process: agenda-setting, policy development and adoption.  
Keywords: global health; diplomacy; non-communicable diseases; chronic diseases; policy; 
global collection action 
 
1. Introduction  
Until recently, chronic diseases such as cancer, diabetes and cardiovascular disorders were 
considered diseases of affluence and not of concern to the developing world. However, these 
conditions, also called non-communicable diseases (NCDs), have now been recognized as a truly 
global problem, further burdening the health care systems of the emerging markets and low-income 
countries. Four types of noncommunicable diseases—cardiovascular diseases, cancers, chronic 
respiratory diseases and diabetes—make the largest contribution to mortality. “These diseases are 
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largely preventable by means of effective interventions that tackle shared risk factors, namely: tobacco 
use, unhealthy diet, physical inactivity and harmful use of alcohol” [1]. 
Since the adoption of the Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2005, there has 
been a lot of interest in the public health community on how to further use global health diplomacy for 
chronic disease control and prevention. In addition to the Framework Convention, members of the 
World Health Organization (WHO) also adopted the Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and 
Health in 2004 and an Action plan to implement this strategy in 2008. We should also highlight two 
resolutions adopted at the World Health Assembly (WHA), on the marketing of food to children and 
about the harmful use of alcohol, as other recent examples of collective action in this arena [2]. 
However, one of the key challenges is to bring collective action on NCDs beyond the traditional health 
forum. This is why the first High-Level Meeting on non-communicable diseases (NCDs) at the United 
Nations General Assembly in September 2011 was considered such an important step; it was the first 
time NCDs received such levels of attention in a forum which does not usually focus on health issues.  
This article aims to draw lessons from the empirical and theoretical literature in political science 
and related disciplines (international relations, international law, public policy) on how best 
policymakers can effectively engage in an exercise of global health diplomacy related to chronic 
diseases. We define here global health diplomacy as the policy processes where state and non-state 
actors seek to design and implement global collective action to address health challenges. The article 
first reviews the existing debates about the incentives and rationale for collective action at the global 
level to address NCDs. Secondly, the article summarizes what the literature would recommend to 
policymakers at the various stages of the policy process. 
2. Rationale for Global Collective Action 
The first question policymakers have to answer before engaging in global health diplomacy, is why 
collective action at the global level is required? Indeed, a large number of multi-sectoral policy options 
available to policymakers to address non-communicable diseases are domestic policies and can be 
effectively implemented at the national or local level, without international collaboration.  
It has been argued that the incentives for participation in global health diplomacy for chronic 
diseases are less powerful than for issues related to infectious diseases. “Interdependence means that 
two countries are mutually dependent with respect to specific activities, events, resources or  
problems.” [3]. With infectious diseases, “the ability of one country to protect the health of its 
population can directly depend on whether another country has the capacity to detect and respond to 
mobile, readily transmissible communicable pathogens” [3]. This perspective proposes that  
non-communicable diseases only involve relationships of interconnectedness among states which do 
not provide strong incentives for joint action, given the lack of the mutual dependence; one country 
may be affected by the actions of another, but the latter country may be unconcerned by what happens 
in the first. “For example, the export by a developed country of processed foods high in added sugars 
and salts may contribute to the prevalence of childhood or adult obesity in a developing country, but 
the health, security, and economic well-being of people in the developed country do not depend on 
whether the developing country controls and reduces the prevalence of obesity in its territory.” [3]. 
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When the literature on global collective action examines global health, it also tends to focus on 
infectious diseases, given the perception that it poses the greatest threat. “Globalization creates an 
increased health interdependency worldwide that stems from enhanced transmission pathways for 
infectious diseases through greater mobility and transfrontier exchanges. […] nations will not sacrifice 
their autonomy with respect to health policy unless the threat is especially dire or they do not have the 
means to address the challenge alone.” ([4], p. 99–100) We propose three main challenges to the view 
that incentives for global health diplomacy are not sufficient when it comes to chronic diseases.  
2.1. Strengthening Public Health Authorities’ Political Position  
First, there is evidence that interdependence is not the only incentive for state actors to participate in 
global health diplomacy. The experience with global health diplomacy around tobacco control 
highlights that the need to strengthen the position of national regulators and public health agencies 
faced with well-organized lobbying from the industry represented a different type of incentives for 
cross-border collaboration [5]. The FCTC differs from usual treaties because, generally, it does not 
address problems between countries. Rather, it addresses problems that all countries share [6]. The 
problem to be addressed was the ability of multinational tobacco companies to undermine the 
regulatory authorities of national governments. Public relations and lobbying strategies adopted by 
tobacco companies in industrial and developing countries contributed to prevent or limit the regulation 
of the industry [7]. This problem was especially acute in developing countries, given the asymmetry of 
resources that can be observed between large global tobacco companies and the governments of  
small nations. 
Moreover, through global health diplomacy for tobacco control, public health authorities were seeking 
support to strength their domestic position to advocate and implement strong tobacco control measures. 
However, ministries of health are often weak players within national decision-making structures; 
building their capacity to obtain strong multi-sectoral collaboration from other governmental agencies 
or ministries, such as law enforcement or finance departments, is often part of the reason why they 
seek international collaboration. Global health diplomacy can be an effective strategy to strengthen 
their position domestically. 
2.2. Transnational Negative Economic Consequences of NCDs 
The second challenge to the perspective that there is little incentive for global collective action for 
chronic disease prevention and control relates to the nature and definition of interdependence and to 
transnational economic externalities. The negative impact of ill-health on economic growth can be an 
incentive for state actors to be involved in global health diplomacy for chronic diseases prevention [8]. 
Social scientists define the public good in very specific terms. Benefits from its provision are  
non-competitive and non-exclusive, i.e., when a unit for good is consumed by one individual, it does 
not affect the consumption opportunities for others from the same unit, and it is virtually impossible to 
exclude individuals from benefiting from this good. Reducing air pollution is a classic example, 
whereas reducing greenhouse gas emissions in view of their impact on global climate would be a 
classic example of global public benefit. Given that it is impossible to exclude anyone from benefiting 
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from the public good (and impossible or very difficult to induce individuals or groups to pay for it), 
beneficial activities for the public good are under-produced by private provision alone.  
Health status at the global level can be considered a global public benefit, given the economic 
externalities effects associated with it. Beyond the health status and security of their own population, 
the global burden of chronic diseases can have a very negative impact on the economic growth and the 
fiscal capacity of a country’s main economic partners. Such transnational economic externalities can 
create incentives to seek collective solutions and participate in global diplomatic efforts to obtain  
that effect.  
There is a large body of economics literature about the effects of ill-health on national and regional 
economies affected by the loss of production and income. Much is debated in that literature, but the 
dominant view remains that good health leads to higher economic growth; it seems to be especially the 
case for developing economies [9–12]. For example, it is estimated that a 10 percent increase in  
life expectancy is associated with an increase in economic growth of at least 0.3 percentage points  
per year [13]. 
The aggregate effect of health on economic growth is not limited to the national level. Given the 
economic interdependence now linking national economies (through trade in goods and services, foreign 
investment and financial markets), this economic impact has regional and global consequences [8]. 
The prosperity of one country is linked to the prosperity of its global neighbors. Investment in health 
improvements in other countries has positive economic externalities for its current and potential 
economic partners. 
The economic impacts of the rise of non-communicable diseases have been documented in the 
research literature. For instance, the impacts of obesity in terms of medical costs and the costs 
associated to absenteeism from work have been reviewed by Finkelstein, Ruhm and Kosa, 2005 [14]. 
In its annual report on global risks, the World Economic Forum highlighted chronic diseases as one of 
the key risks to the global economy. “One-half of those who die from chronic diseases are in their 
productive years and so the social costs and economic consequences in terms of lost productivity are 
considerable. This fact, coupled with rising healthcare costs to employers, has made the private sector 
aware of the problem, in particular because many of these costs are preventable. In the US, the 
avoidable indirect impact of chronic disease, due for example to productivity losses, is four times as 
high as the direct costs of healthcare coverage. The WHO estimates that between 2005 and 2015 
income loss could rise to as much as US$ 558 billion in China, US$ 237 billion in India, US$ 303 
billion in Russia and US$ 33 billion in the United Kingdom. Brazil, Russia, India and China currently 
lose more than 20 million productive life-years annually to chronic diseases, and that number is 
expected to grow 65% by 2030. The losses in productivity associated with those diseases, through 
disability, unplanned absences and increased accidents, are as much as 400% more than the cost of 
treatment.” ([15], p. 25–26). 
Despite the evidence as to the economic impact on the nations that are seeing a greater prevalence 
of chronic disease and on their economic partners, the level of global mobilization still remains 
relatively limited. One potential explanation could be that both the medical and non-medical costs of 
chronic diseases are not made sufficiently visible and explicit to policymakers; a strategy to increase 
the quality and visibility of information about the global economic impacts of chronic disease could be 
an important part of increasing incentives for cross-border collaboration.  
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2.3. Globalization of the Food System 
The third challenge to the view that non-communicable diseases do not lend themselves to global 
collective action is the need for coordinated regulation in a globalized economy. When it comes to the 
promotion of healthy diets, one could argue that incentives for state actors to engage in cross-border 
collaboration are strong, given the increasingly globalized nature of the food system. For instance, 
26% of the global market for packaged food products is controlled by 10 large multinational 
companies. In 2007, one retailer, Walmart, controlled 6% of world grocery sales [16]. If one wants to 
transform food systems toward healthier diets, it cannot be done effectively by focusing on local or 
national actions alone; one has to develop collaborative approaches in which the globalized food 
industry is fully engaged.  
 
2.4. Non-State Actors 
We have highlighted three types of incentives for global collective action for state actors to address 
non-communicable diseases. However, a key feature of contemporary global health diplomacy is the 
strong involvement of a diversity of non-state actors in the different phases of the process. Therefore, 
understanding the incentive for non-state actors, including commercial as well as not-for-profit 
organizations, to be engaged at the global level is crucial to have a complete portrait of the dynamics at 
work. Incentives are related to the costs and benefits of participation vs. non-participation and will vary 
greatly from one actor to another. “Resolving collective action problems requires a clear understanding 
of the nature, scale and timing of the costs and benefits to different countries and other parties” [17]. 
Understanding the structure of incentives of the private sector is especially important for global 
health diplomacy for chronic disease prevention and control. This is not only because of the central 
role played by the agri-food industry and other commercial actors in the rise of NCDs by the 
contribution of these actors to unhealthy food environments, but also in the role they can play in the 
design and implementation of effective solutions. In some cases, there may be a clear convergence 
between the commercial interests of some sectors and public health goals. For instance, producers and 
processors of fruit and vegetables will have strong incentives to participate to an effort to promote 
greater availability, affordability and access to fruit and vegetables, given the potential benefits to their 
operation, as the initiative is likely to increase their revenues.  
Other factors that can create incentives for the private sector participation are: increases in consumer 
demand, public pressure from civil society organizations and consumers and the threat of new and 
potentially more onerous regulation [18]. On the last point, and in regard to firms producing for many 
different national markets, the reality of the globalization of many components of food value chains 
actually creates incentives to work towards the harmonization of standards and rules: these incentives 
being the reduction of costs and achieving higher economies of scale. 
Understanding the structure of the industry is a key step to understanding the costs and benefits 
associated with the policy response. The analysis should include a mapping of the relevant industrial 
actors (agriculture, agri-food, transportation), of key indicators of their economic interests (revenues, 
market share, segmentation of their consumers) and of the key characteristics of structure of the industry 
and value-chain into which they are integrated (lead firm, concentration, fragmentation, geographical 
span). For instance, if a small number of processed and snack foods processors controls the majority of 
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the global market, these multinational firms will have strong incentives to realize cross-border 
collaboration on nutritional labeling and formulation standards, in order to reduce their costs of 
compliance to diverse national regulations. On the other hand, if the analysis highlights that children 
and adolescents constitute a large part of the consumers of these same foods, policymakers will have to 
take into account the much weaker incentives that these firms have in collaborating on cross-border 
action on the marketing of food and beverages to children. Policymakers can also, by their actions, 
affect the structure of incentives which will influence the participation of commercial actors. For 
instance, by using instruments such as subsidies or procurement policies, governments can encourage 
or discourage the consumption of certain food products; we have recently seen such an approach in the 
European Union in regard to fresh fruit and vegetables. Mapping the actors, interests and structural 
features of the relevant industries and value chains is essential to assess whether a collaborative or 
regulatory approach is most likely to be the most effective approach. 
In addition to the commercial actors, there have been many non-governmental organizations 
involved in global health diplomacy. A large and diverse group of actors is included in this category: 
international federations of professional associations, health advocacy groups, humanitarian and 
development NGOs, philanthropic organizations. These non-state actors are capable of exerting 
influence at the global level; for example, the role of Medecins sans Frontières and Oxfam in the 
adoption of the Ministerial Declaration on Public Health at the WTO Ministerial Conference in 2001 is 
well documented. [19] What are the incentives for these organizations to be involved in global health 
diplomacy? Like commercial actors, if there is a clear convergence between the objectives of a global 
collective action under consideration and the objectives of the organization, the incentives for 
collaborating to this exercise in global health diplomacy can be very strong. For instance, health 
advocacy groups who have been lobbying for stricter regulations of the marketing of food may have 
very strong motivation to participate in consultations and negotiations about a global code of conduct 
as a way to strengthen their capacity to advocate stronger regulation at the national level. 
Being involved in global health diplomacy also can offer a number of organizational benefits for 
non-state actors, beyond the achievement of their specific objectives. It can improve their institutional 
capacity by facilitating networking with like-minded groups and access to decision makers in 
governments. It can increase their visibility at the national and global level, therefore increasing their 
capacity to influence decision-makers, to raise funds and to increase membership. Factors which can 
reduce the incentives for collaboration includes the risks of losing independence from government or 
private sectors (or being perceived as such), of losing members, funding and credibility if involved in 
controversial matters where there is no consensus. The latter is especially important in chronic disease 
prevention, as there is very strong resistance among a number of non-state actors to collaborate with 
private sector actors.  
3. Phases of the Policy Process 
The policy process includes different phases, and in order to engage in global health diplomacy, 
policymakers need to have a good understanding of what phase the policy process has already reached. 
Each phase involves actors in a different manner and therefore, involves a different dynamic, and will 
mean different objectives for global health diplomacy. In this section, we examine what strategies the 
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literature in political sciences highlight as potentially effective in the agenda-setting phase, the policy 
development phase and the policy selection phase. 
3.1. Agenda Setting 
The first step is the agenda setting phase. Policymakers have a limited amount of time and resources 
to allocate to address policy problems. The policy agenda is composed of the policy problems, which 
receive the attention of government officials at any given moment [20]. There is a hierarchy in these 
problems, as some issues are deemed to be a priority; they are considered more urgent or more 
significant in terms of their impact at national and global levels. Political scientists have clearly shown 
how the agenda setting process, like the other phases of the policy process, is not simply a rational 
unfolding of the bureaucratic assessment of a problem and the design of a solution. Rather, it is a 
political process where interests, ideas and institutions meet, and where the very definition of what 
constitutes a problem is open to political contest [21]. 
If an issue is still not present or very low on the global health agenda, the objective of global 
collective action could be to change this state of affairs and bring policy attention to this issue. In the 
case of chronic diseases, this phase of problem definition has been partly achieved. The most prominent 
medical journals have called for global action on non-communicable diseases. Health research funders 
are starting to show greater interest, as witnessed by the creation of the Global Alliance on Chronic 
Diseases, which brings together the health research funding agencies of Canada, China, India, the 
United States, Australia and the UK [22,23]. Non-governmental organizations have also been active in 
putting chronic diseases on the global agenda. For instance, in May 2009, three global NGOs: the 
International Diabetes Federation, the International Union Against Cancer, and the World Heart 
Federation (representing more than 700 national organizations), called for the creation of a special 
envoy of the United Nations Secretary General for non-communicable diseases, a session of the UN 
general assembly to be devoted to the topic and to add action to combat chronic diseases to the list of 
millennium development goals [24]. These groups later joined the NCD Alliance to coordinate their 
action, once the members of the United Nations agreed to a special session of the General Assembly, 
focusing on NCDs. 
Until recently, the field of global health diplomacy on chronic diseases remained strongly  
‘WHO-centric’ [25]. Indeed, before the shift to the UN General Assembly, two prominent outcomes of 
diplomacy on NCD were negotiated at the WHO: the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, and 
the Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health. Moreover, a number of issues are already on 
the agenda of the WHO or other forums: marketing of food to children, the harmful use of alcohol and 
nutritional labeling. One of the key challenges was to bring NCDs beyond the traditional health forum; 
this is why the UN High-Level Meeting is seen as such a great opportunity. 
If policymakers identify a policy problem still in the agenda-setting phase for which they want to 
engage in global health diplomacy, what key elements should they consider in order to be effective? 
One consideration is the impact of the media on the political agenda. Scholars from communications 
studies tend to put forward empirical evidence supporting the agenda-setting power of the mass media. 
However, political scientists investigating similar questions are quite divided [26]. The traditional view 
of the media in political science is of an accommodating conduit for elite messages, not as an actor 
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with its own objectives which can independently affect the policy process. In a review of twenty 
agenda-setting studies, mostly focusing on domestic policy issues, Walgrave and Aelst suggested that 
factors such as the type of media under scrutiny can explain variations in the influence of the media in 
agenda-setting. Indeed, elite media, in contrast to popular media, are considered to play a more active 
role in the shaping of the policymakers’ views on foreign policy [27,28]. Moreover, the type of issues 
at stake is a variable to take into account. The role of the media in putting issues on the political 
agenda is deemed greater in foreign policy than domestic policy, given the unobtrusive nature of these 
issues. Given that most individuals, including policymakers, do not have direct experience with these 
issues in their daily lives, they would not be observable without media reporting [29].  
Media reporting on chronic diseases globally has increased. This is important, given the 
unobtrusiveness of the economic impact of chronic diseases. Adopting a global strategy with partners 
to increase media coverage, especially in globally elite media (e.g. The Economist, The Wall Street 
Journal), about chronic diseases and potential responses, can be an effective approach to agenda 
setting. This may be especially important in order to set the agenda beyond the confine of traditional 
health forums such as the WHO.  
The multiple streams model first developed by Kingdon, which has become widely used to study 
domestic policy processes [30], and more recently foreign policymaking, [31] stresses the importance 
of events such as crises, disasters, or powerful symbolic actions on agenda setting [32,33]. Dramatic 
events such as crises, disasters, or powerful symbolic actions have a strong impact on agenda  
setting [20]. Such events are recurrent in infectious diseases, with outbreak events and epidemics 
focusing the attention of decision makers; chronic diseases are less likely to trigger such focusing 
events. The role of policy champions can compensate for this. 
Policy champions, also called policy entrepreneurs, can be individuals or groups located inside or 
outside political or administrative structures. Together, they are active in defining the nature of 
problems that deserve attention, as well as offering proposals to policymakers regarding the solutions 
for these problems. [20] In policymaking at the global level, policy entrepreneurs can be leaders of 
international organizations, leaders of individual countries or groupings of countries, business 
organizations, global civil society organizations or transnational advocacy networks that influence the 
process of construction and the acceptance of an issue as a problem requiring the collective action of 
nations [34]. It is has been proposed that policy entrepreneurs are most effective in situations where 
incremental changes are not suited and major changes involving disruption to established ways address 
challenges are required. This corresponds well to the type of changes required to affect the food choice 
architecture faced by individuals and populations in contemporary societies. 
3.2. Policy Development 
The second phase of the policy process is policy development, where proposals are generated and 
debated. The problem is now identified and on the policy radar of authorities, but in this phase, 
political actors are developing and putting forward proposals to address the problem. For example, the 
problems related to the increasingly higher salt content of processed food and hence diets are emerging 
on the global health policy agenda (see for example the World Action for Salt and Health 
http://www.worldactiononsalt.com/ and the PAHO/WHO Regional Expert Group on Cardiovascular 
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Disease Prevention through Dietary Salt Reduction). However, policy responses at the global level are 
still in the making.  
If a policy process for global health diplomacy is in this phase, what elements should policy 
officials consider to be effective? An overview of the policy responses being proposed by experts and 
specialists is one important component. Indeed, this phase of the policy process is often influenced by 
global communities of specialists in a policy area (these have been called policy communities [20] and 
epistemic communities [35]. The policymaking process, at the national or global level, is not only 
explained by power, influence and pressure from interest groups. The influence of ideas in global 
collective action has been increasingly recognized. Experts can play an important role “in articulating 
the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, helping states identify their interests, framing 
the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient points for 
negotiation. […] control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of power and that 
the diffusion of new ideas and data can lead to new patterns of behavior and prove to be an important 
determinant of international policy coordination.” ([35], p. 1). 
Therefore, policymakers identifying an issue which has reached this phase of the policy process 
have to adopt a strategy of engagement with communities of experts at home and abroad who are 
putting forward policy proposals for national and global responses to the rise of chronic diseases. The 
mechanisms of engagement can include the commissioning of policy papers or review of literature, the 
convening of ad hoc consultative roundtables or permanent expert committees, the participation of 
officials at academic and policy conferences, etc. Whatever the means of engagement, the objective is 
to collect information in order to develop evidence-based policy proposals. 
Moreover, in order to be effective in this phase of global health diplomacy, officials will have to 
decide what proposals they support, based not only on their assessment of the technical value, but also 
depending on political feasibility. Therefore, building support among international partners about the 
purpose and form of those global initiatives under consideration is crucial. These partners can be other 
national governmental agencies or non-state actors. The development of shared understanding is a key 
component of pre-negotiations and one important way to achieve a shared understanding comes in the 
form of joint fact-finding exercises [36]. “Joint fact-finding encompasses any process by which a 
group of stakeholders seeks agreement on a set of questions to be investigated, ways to conduct the 
investigation, experts and others resources, people to be involved and ways to interpret and use the 
results for decision making” ([36], p. 336). 
Joint fact finding can take the form of expert groups, scientific advisory committee, or commissions, 
or more ambitiously, large long-term endeavors such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), which has produced reports on the health impacts of climate change. In addition to 
clarifying the purpose and functions of global initiatives under consideration, joint fact finding can also 
contribute to future successful negotiations by building trust among parties and by strengthening the 
capacity of partners who have less knowledge and expertise in the policy area under consideration. 
Looking outside chronic diseases, and as an example of such a joint fact finding exercise, we can 
highlight the Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and Development (CEWG), created by 
the WHA in 2010 to assess proposals to increase resources devoted to research on diseases that 
principally affect developing countries [37]. We do not know yet if these discussions will lead to the 
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negotiation of a new treaty on research and development, but it created the basis for more productive 
discussions among members with divergent views. 
Creating or supporting the creation of a regional or global experts group or other type of joint  
fact-finding exercise can be an effective means of engagement in global health diplomacy for chronic 
disease, when the issue at hand has reached the second phase of the policy process. It facilitates the 
generation of strong and evidence-based proposals; it can facilitate consensus-building among parties 
by narrowing the range of options being considered. The creation of a global experts group, including 
scientists from the private sector, to make specific recommendations on standards on the formulation 
of processed food, or regarding the salt content of food products, would be an example of what forms 
such engagement could take. 
3.3. Policy Selection 
The third phase of the policy process is the policy selection phase which includes an authoritative 
choice among those alternatives; in diplomacy, this is the process of negotiation between parties which 
leads to an agreement. The discussion at the World Health Organization about a code of practice on the 
marketing of food to children is an example of global health diplomacy which has reached this phase. 
Once officials establish that the policy process has reached that point, they now have to establish their 
positions in the negotiations and their strategies to achieve their objective. 
International negotiations are always taking place in the context of power asymmetry. Some 
countries or some actors have more influence over outcomes than others, given their economic power, 
their scientific expertise, or other assets. In the context of global health diplomacy, this situation is 
exacerbated by the fact that health ministries and agencies tend to be less powerful within their own 
governments. There are two main strategies available to officials to compensate for such power 
asymmetry: coalition building and preparation for negotiations [36]. 
One key component of preparation for international negotiations is the establishment of national 
positions. Scholars of diplomacy have studied international negotiations as a “two-level game.” “At the 
national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable 
policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the 
international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy  
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments” [38]. The 
national process of consultations inside and outside government is an integral part of diplomacy.  
Within government, there will be a diversity of views as to what specific positions and strategies a 
country should take during international negotiations. The creation of an inter-ministerial committee to 
broker these different perspectives is a well-established practice in international negotiations. Such a 
committee plays a central role of brokering the possibly divergent views as to how better to maximize 
public health outcomes while protecting and promoting commercial interests. The experience with 
health-related trade negotiations has highlighted the importance of such institutional mechanisms for  
inter-sectoral collaboration [39]. 
The consultation process at the national level is often a crucial work of such a committee, or the 
agency which leads the negotiation process. Whether they take place in a formal process, or remain 
rather informal, such consultations will strengthen the evidence base of the policymaking process and 
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facilitate the brokering and balancing process necessary to establish a coherent national position. 
Mechanisms for consultations can include the creation of a formal advisory group with specific 
membership, an open call for comments on a discussion paper prepared by the government, through 
online or face-to-face meetings. Greater transparency tends to be associated with greater legitimacy for 
this phase of the policy process. 
Once a clear negotiating mandate is established at the national level, global health diplomacy in its 
most conventional form can take place, i.e., formal negotiations between parties. In international 
negotiations where the parties have different preferred outcomes, the process will involve the exchange 
of concessions. A party can concede to the preferences of another party, and in exchange, ensure its 
priority is reflected in the final text. For instance, a national government may be willing to accept weak 
language on the impact of trade agreements on trade in tobacco in the Framework convention on 
tobacco control in exchange for clear and explicit standards on the marketing of tobacco. In such 
negotiations, building coalitions with like-minded parties has often offered a useful strategy for smaller 
countries seeking to achieve their objectives. 
4. Conclusions 
After discussing three types of incentive for global collective action on NCDs, this article described 
several strategies that can be used to enhance the likelihood that exercises in global health diplomacy 
lead to successful outcome. During the agenda-setting phase, we highlighted the role of the media, 
policy entrepreneurs and civil society organizations. In the policy development phase, engagement 
with experts and the creation of joint fact-finding processes are promising strategies. During policy 
selection, when we move to the formal negotiations, coalition building and preparations at the 
domestic level are key components of a successful approach. In conclusion, we discuss which of these 
elements appear to have been the most determinant in the recent attempt to achieve a global response 
to NCDs: the NCD Summit at the United Nations. 
After several months of negotiations, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted on 
September 16th 2011 a political declaration that acknowledges the scope of the crisis and identifies the 
key components of a “whole of government and whole of society” response [40]. Most parties agree 
that this consensus document is only a first step in terms of mounting a global response to epidemics. 
Several experts analyzing the outcome of the summit found the declaration “lacking in targets, funds 
and action.” [41] and therefore, a missed opportunity [42]. 
One of the most determinant variables to explain the relatively weak outcome of this exercise in 
global health diplomacy is the weak presence of grass-roots advocacy and activism concerning  
non-communicable diseases. One of the key lessons from previous successes in global health 
diplomacy is the key role of civil society organizations’ mobilization in ensuring a strong collective 
response. This explanatory variable has certainly been identified as central in the negotiations of the 
Framework convention on tobacco control [43]. Grass-roots activism and global mobilization are also 
key factors behind the changes in financing for, and access to, treatment for HIV-AIDS patients in the 
developing world.  
The policy process leading to the NCD High-level meeting was not devoid of civil society actors. 
On the contrary, we observed that the NCD alliance has been very active throughout the process: 
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conducting consultations internally to develop a proposed outcome document and collaboration in the 
production of and participation in key articles in the main scientific journals such as the Lancet, as well 
as many articles in the mass media. They also met face to face with a large number of missions in New 
York and participated in official meetings such as the Global Health Forum that took place in Moscow. 
The civil society hearings in New York attracted the participation of more than 200 Chief Scientific 
Officers, including members of the NCD Alliance. 
However, what was lacking was extensive grass-roots activism demanding change at the local and 
national level in terms how governments work to prevent and treat NCDs. As noted by researchers at 
the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, “while the NCD Alliance is emerging as the main 
force of civil society engagement, in some cases national and international member societies are 
dominated by medical professionals and do not significantly involve people living with and  
affected by NCDs” [44]. 
Such grass-roots activism would have put pressure on political leaders, and therefore on delegations 
sent to New York, to be more ambitious in terms of what should be achieved at the global level. 
Moreover, we noted the lack of non-health NGOs in the public debate. We have not seen unions, 
development NGOs, faith groups or other types of organizations engaged in making demands and 
advocating for change at the national or global level.  
Another factor to consider, in order to move beyond what was agreed at the High-Level meeting, is 
the need to make greater explicit economic interdependence a key rationale for global collective action 
on NCDs. The economic case for the need to negotiate a global response to the rise of NCDs has not 
been yet sufficiently made for policymakers to be strongly motivated to invest significant time and 
political capital. The follow-up to the High-Level Meeting, mandated by the Political Declaration, may 
be an opportunity to do so, and to build on the momentum created by such an event. 
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